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MULTI-PLAYER STOPPING GAMES IN CONTINUOUS TIME
ZHOU ZHOU
Abstract. We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in
our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can
adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other players’ behaviors. Assuming the continuity
of the payoff functions in time, we show that there always exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in pure
stopping strategies for any ǫ > 0.
1. Introduction
Since [4], Dynkin game has attracted a lot of research. We refer to [3–7,9–18] and the references
therein. In a Dynkin game, each player chooses a stopping strategy, and the payoffs of the players
are revealed as long as one player stops. In other words, the game ends at the minimum of the
stopping strategies. With some assumptions on the relationship between the payoff processes, it
is proved in e.g., [7, 12] that a two-player non-zero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time admits
a Nash equilibrium in pure stopping times. In general, without such assumptions, the two-player
Dynkin game only has a Nash equilibrium in randomized strategies, see e.g., [12]. It is known that
when there are more than two players, the Dynkin game in continuous time may not have any Nash
Equilibrium in randomized strategies even if the payoff processes are constant (see e.g., [13]).
As a classical model of stopping games, Dynkin game has many applications in economics and
finance. However, it has two major limitations in many situations. First of all, in practice, it is
more often that, even if a player has made the decision first, her payoff can still be affected by
other players’ decisions later on. In other words, it is more reasonable that the games end at the
maximum of the stopping strategies. Second, a wise player would adjust her strategy after she
observes other players’ actions, and Dynkin games cannot incorporate this “game” feature.
Recently [1,2,19,20] begin to consider the stopping games with these two features. In particular,
assuming that the payoff functions are continuous in time, [19] shows that a two-player non-zero-sum
stopping game always admits an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for any ǫ > 0.
In this paper, we extend the result in [19] to the multi-player case. To be more specific, given a
filtered probability space (Ω,F , (F)t∈[0,∞],P), we consider the stopping game in continuous time
ui(ρ1, . . . ,ρN ) = E[U i(ρ1, . . . ,ρN )], i = 1, . . . , N,
where the player i chooses ρi to maximize the payoff ui. Here U i(t1, . . . , tN ) is Ft1∨...∨tN -measurable
instead of Ft1∧...∧tN -measurable as is assumed in Dynkin games. That is, the game ends at the
maximum of players’ stopping. Moreover, here ρi is not a stopping times. It is a strategy that
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2can be adjusted according to other players’ actions. By assuming U i is uniformly continuous in
(t1, . . . , tN ), we show that the game always admits an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for any
ǫ > 0.
We prove the result by an induction on the number of the players. That is, we construct an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the N -player game from the ǫ-Nash equilibriums of (N − 1)-player games as
well as ǫ-saddle points of some zero-sum games. To reduce the burden of the notation, we only
focus on the three-player case (N = 3), and the proof still works accordingly for the case with more
players.
Our game has a wide range of applications, e.g., when companies choose times to take actions,
and e.g., when investors who both short and long American options try to maximize their utilities.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide the setup and the main result.
In Section 3, we provide some auxiliary results. In section 4, we use these auxiliary results to
construct an ǫ-equilibrium for the original game.
2. Setup and the main result
In this section, we will provide the general setup and the main result. Theorem 2.6 is the main
result of this paper.
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,∞],P) be a filtered probability space, where F = F∞ and (Ft)t∈[0,∞] satisfies
the usual conditions. To avoid the technical difficulties stemming from the verification of path
regularities of some related processes, we assume that Ω is at most countable, and P is supported
on Ω. Let T be the set of stopping times. For ρ ∈ T , denote Tρ (resp. Tρ+) be the set of stopping
times that is no less (resp. strictly greater) than ρ on {ρ <∞}.
Definition 2.1. Let N ∈ N and I be the set of all the subsets of {1, . . . , N − 1}. A 2N−1-
tuple ρ = (ρα)α∈I is said to be a stopping strategy (of order N), if ρ := ρ∅ ∈ T , and for any
I = (i1, . . . , in) ⊂ {1, . . . , N − 1} with i1 < . . . < in,
ρi1,... ,in : [0,∞]
n × Ω 7→ [0,∞] is B([0,∞]n)⊗F-measurable,
and
ρi1,... ,in(t1, . . . , tn, ·) ∈ T(t1∨...∨tn)+.
Denote TN as the set of stopping strategies of order N . For σ ∈ T , let
T
N
σ := {ρ = (ρα)α∈I ∈ T
N : ρ ≥ σ}.
The interpretation of ρ ∈ TN is as follows. Suppose there are N players, and each of them needs
to choose a time to make a decision (stop). Let ρ be player N ’s stopping strategy. At the beginning,
player N chooses an initial stopping time ρ. If no other players stop before ρ, then player N stops
at time ρ. Otherwise, player N observes someone stops before ρ. Say, it is player 1 who stops
first at time t < ρ. Then player N observes player 1’s action, and immediate switches to strategy
ρ1(t). In general, ρi1,... ,in(t1, . . . , tn, ·) represents the strategy that player N uses, if she has not
stopped by time t1∨ . . .∨ tn, and she observes that players i1, . . . , in have stopped at time t1, . . . , tn
respectively.
3Let ρi ∈ TN , i = 1, . . . , N , which presents the stopping strategy for player i in an N -player game.
Denote ρi[ρ−i] as the actual time when player i stops under the other players’ stopping strategies
ρ−i := (ρ1, . . . ,ρi−1,ρi+1, . . . ,ρN ). Due to the complexity of the notation, we will not explicitly
write out the expression of ρi[ρ−i]. Instead, we give two examples when N = 2 and N = 3.
Example 2.2. Let ρ = (ρ, ρ1), τ = (τ, τ1) ∈ T
2. Then
ρ[τ ] = ρ1{ρ≤τ} + ρ1(τ)1{ρ>τ},
where ρ1(τ) := ρ1(τ(·), ·).
Example 2.3. Let ρ = (ρ, ρ2, ρ3, ρ23), τ = (τ, τ1, τ3, τ13),σ = (σ, σ1, σ2, σ12) ∈ T
3. Then
ρ[τ ,σ ] = ρ1{ρ≤τ∧σ} + ρ23(τ, σ)1{ρ>τ=σ}
+ ρ3(σ)1{ρ,τ>σ}∩{ρ3(σ)≤τ3(σ)} + ρ23(τ3(σ), σ)1{ρ,τ>σ}∩{ρ3 (σ)>τ3(σ)}
+ ρ2(τ)1{ρ,σ>τ}∩{ρ2(τ)≤σ2(τ)} + ρ23(τ, σ2(τ))1{ρ,σ>τ}∩{ρ2(τ)>σ2(τ)},
where ρ23(τ, σ) := ρ23(τ(·), σ(·), ·).
For i = 1, . . . , N , let U i : [0,∞]N ×Ω 7→ R such that U i(t1, . . . , tN ) is Ft1∨...∨tN -measurable. We
make the following standing assumption throughout this paper.
Assumption 2.4. There exists a bounded nondecreasing function η : R+ 7→ R+ satisfying limδց0 η(δ) =
η(0) = 0, such that for i = 1, . . . , N , and any (t1, . . . , tN ), (t
′
1, . . . , t
′
N ) ∈ [0,∞]
N ,
|U i(t1, . . . , tN )− U
i(t′1 . . . , t
′
N )| < η(|t1 − t
′
1|+ . . .+ |tN − t
′
N |).
Now for any θ ∈ T , consider the N -player stopping game in continuous time
ui(ρ1, . . . ,ρN ) := Eθ
[
U i(ρ1[ρ−1], . . . ,ρN [ρ−N ])
]
, ρ1, . . . ,ρN ∈ TNθ , i = 1, . . . , N, (2.1)
where Eθ[·] := E[·|Fθ]. Here player i chooses the stopping strategy ρ
i to maximize her own utility
U i. Recall the definition of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.5. For ǫ > 0, the N -tuple (ρˆ1, . . . , ρˆN ) ∈ (TNθ )
N is said to be an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
(in pure stopping strategies) for the game (2.1), if for any ρ1, . . . ,ρN ∈ TNθ ,
ui(ρˆ1, . . . ρˆi−1,ρi, ρˆi+1, . . . , ρˆN ) ≤ ui(ρˆ1, . . . ρˆi−1, ρˆi, ρˆi+1, . . . , ρˆN ) + ǫ, i = 1, . . . , N.
Below is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.6. Under Assumption 2.4, there are exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game (2.1)
for any ǫ > 0.
Remark 2.7. Our game can also be adapted to the case when each player has multiple stopping.
For example, suppose each player has double stopping. Then we can treat player i as new players
2i − 1 and 2i, and let U˜2i−1 := U˜2i := U i. Of course, by doing so, a Nash equilibrium in the new
game may not be optimal for each player in the old game. (Recall that it is possible that a Nash
equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for f i(x, y) = f(x, y), i = 1, 2 may not be optimal for supx,y f(x, y).)
4We will prove Theorem 2.6 by an induction on the number of players. We will construct an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the N -player game from ǫ-Nash equilibriums of (N −1)-player games, as well
as some ǫ-saddle points of some related zero-sum games. By [19, Theorem 2.4], Theorem 2.6 holds
when N = 2. (Although in [19] the game starts from time t = 0, but the proof there still works if
the game starts at any stopping time.) To reduce the burden of the notation, we will only prove
the result when N = 3. It can be seen later on that our proof also works for general N , as long as
we assume that Theorem 2.6 holds for N − 1.
We will first provide some auxiliary results in the next section.
3. Some auxiliary results
In this section, we provide some auxiliary results in preparation for the proof of Theorem 2.6
when N = 3. Some of the proofs may admit simpler solutions, yet we demonstrate them in such
ways in order to let the proofs also work for N > 3. It is worth noting that as Ω is at most
countable, those results that hold w.r.t. any t ∈ [0,∞] also hold w.r.t. any θ ∈ T .
Lemma 3.1. For i = 1, 2, let Gi : [0,∞]3 × Ω 7→ R such that Gi(r, s, t) is Fr∨s∨t-measurable and
satisfies Assumption 2.4. Then for any ǫ > 0, there exists h > 0, such that for any t ∈ [0,∞), there
exists (ρˆ, τˆ ) ∈ (T2t )
2 such that for any δ ∈ [0, h], (ρˆ, τˆ ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game
Et−δ
[
Gi(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t− δ)
]
, ρ, τ ∈ T2t−δ, i = 1, 2.
Proof. For any ǫ > 0, let h > 0 such that η(h) < ǫ. Now for any t ∈ [0,∞), by [19, Theorem 2.4],
there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ρ∗ = (ρ∗, ρ∗1), τ
∗ = (τ∗, τ∗1 )) ∈ (Tt)
2 for the game
Et
[
Gi(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)
]
, ρ, τ ∈ T2t , i = 1, 2.
Let ρˆ := (ρ∗, ρˆ1) and τˆ := (τ
∗, τˆ1), where
ρˆ1(s) =


ρ∗1(t), if s < t 6= ρ
∗,
t, if s < t = ρ∗,
ρ∗1(s), if s ≥ t,
and τˆ1(s) =


τ∗1 (t), if s < t 6= τ
∗,
t, if s < t = τ∗,
τ∗1 (s), if s ≥ t.
It can be shown that ρˆ, τˆ ∈ T2t , and for any ρ,τ ∈ T
2
t ,
ρˆ[τ ] = ρ∗[τ ], τ [ρˆ] = τ [ρ∗], τˆ [ρ] = τ ∗[ρ], ρ[τˆ ] = ρ[τ ∗].
Then (ρˆ, τˆ ) is a 3ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game
Et
[
Gi(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t− δ)
]
, ρ, τ ∈ T2t , i = 1, 2.
5for any δ ∈ [0, h]. Indeed, for any ρ ∈ T2t ,
Et
[
G1(ρ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ], t− δ)
]
≤ Et
[
U1(ρ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ], t)
]
+ ǫ
= Et
[
G1(ρ[τ ∗], τ ∗[ρ], t)
]
+ ǫ
≤ Et
[
G1(ρ∗[τ ∗], τ ∗[ρ∗], t)
]
+ 2ǫ
= Et
[
G1(ρˆ[τ ∗], τˆ [ρ∗], t)
]
+ 2ǫ
= Et
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t)
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ Et
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)
]
+ 3ǫ.
Now take ρ = (ρ, ρ1) ∈ T
2
t−δ. We have that
Et−δ
[
G1(ρ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ], t− δ)1{ρ<t<τ∗}
]
= Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(ρ, τ∗1 (t), t− δ)
]
1{ρ<t<τ∗}
]
≤ Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(t, τ∗1 (t), t− δ)
]
1{ρ<t<τ∗}
]
+ ǫ
= Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(ρ¯[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ¯], t− δ)
]
1{ρ<t<τ∗}
]
+ ǫ
≤ Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)
]
1{ρ<t<τ∗}
]
+ 4ǫ
= Et−δ
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)1{ρ<t<τ∗}
]
+ 4ǫ,
and
Et−δ
[
G1(ρ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ], t− δ)1{ρ<t=τ∗}
]
= Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(ρ, t, t− δ)
]
1{ρ<t=τ∗}
]
≤ Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(t, t, t− δ)
]
1{ρ<t=τ∗}
]
+ ǫ
= Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(ρ¯[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ¯], t− δ)
]
1{ρ<t=τ∗}
]
+ ǫ
≤ Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)
]
1{ρ<t=τ∗}
]
+ 4ǫ
= Et−δ
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)1{ρ<t=τ∗}
]
+ 4ǫ,
and
Et−δ
[
G1(ρ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ], t− δ)1{ρ≥t}
]
= Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(ρ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ], t− δ)
]
1{ρ≥t}
]
≤ Et−δ
[
Et
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)
]
1{ρ≥t}
]
+ 3ǫ
= Et−δ
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)1{ρ≥t}
]
+ 3ǫ,
where ρ¯ := (t, ρ1(s) ≡ s+ 1) ∈ T
2
t . Therefore,
Et−δ
[
G1(ρ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ], t− δ)
]
≤ Et−δ
[
G1(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)
]
+ 11ǫ.
Similarly, we can show that for any τ ∈ T2t−δ,
Et−δ
[
G2(ρˆ[τ ], τ [ρˆ], t− δ)
]
≤ Et−δ
[
G2(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)
]
+ 11ǫ.

Lemma 3.2. Let G : [0,∞]3 × Ω 7→ R such that G(r, s, t) is Fr∨s∨t-measurable. Then
inf
ρ,τ∈T2t
Et [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)] = inf
ρ,τ∈Tt
Et [G(ρ, τ, t)] .
6Proof. Fix t ∈ [0,∞). For any ρ,τ ∈ T2t , ρ[τ ], τ [ρ] ∈ Tt, and thus
Et [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)] ≥ inf
ρ,τ∈Tt
Et [G(ρ, τ, t)] .
This implies that
inf
ρ,τ∈T2t
Et [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)] ≥ inf
ρ,τ∈Tt
Et [G(ρ, τ, t)] .
Conversely, for any ρ, τ ∈ Tt, let
ρ1(s) =

ρ, if s < ρ,∞, otherwise, and τ1(s) =

τ, if s < τ,∞, otherwise, (3.1)
and ρ¯ = (ρ, ρ1), τ¯ = (τ, τ1). Then ρ¯, τ¯ ∈ T
2
t , and ρ¯[τ¯ ] = ρ and τ¯ [ρ¯] = τ . Therefore,
inf
ρ,τ∈T2t
Et [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)] ≤ Et [G(ρ, τ, t)] .
This implies that
inf
ρ,τ∈T2t
Et [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)] ≤ inf
ρ,τ∈Tt
Et [G(ρ, τ, t)] .

Lemma 3.3. Let G : [0,∞]3 × Ω 7→ R such that G(r, s, t) is Fr∨s∨t-measurable and satisfies
Assumption 2.4. Then for any ǫ > 0, there exists h > 0, such that for any t ∈ [0,∞), there exists
(ρˆ, τˆ ) ∈ (T2t )
2 such that for any δ ∈ [0, h], (ρˆ, τˆ ) is an ǫ-optimizer for
gt−δ := inf
ρ,τ∈T2
t−δ
Et−δ [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t− δ)] . (3.2)
That is, for any δ ∈ [0, h],
Et−δ [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)] ≤ gt−δ + ǫ.
Proof. For any ǫ > 0, let h > 0 such that η(h) < ǫ. Fix t ∈ [0,∞). By Lemma 3.2,
gt = inf
ρ,τ∈Tt
Et [G(ρ, τ, t)] . (3.3)
Let (ρ∗, τ∗) ∈ (Tt)
2 be an ǫ-optimizer for gt in (3.3). Define ρˆ, τˆ ∈ T
2
t as in (3.1) such that ρˆ[τˆ ] = ρ
∗
and τˆ [ρˆ] = τ∗. Now for any δ ∈ [0, h], we have that
Et−δ [U(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)] − gt−δ = Et−δ [U(ρ
∗, τ∗, t− δ)] − gt−δ
≤ Et−δ [Et [U(ρ
∗, τ∗, t)]]− gt−δ + ǫ
≤ Et−δ
[
inf
ρ,τ∈Tt
Et [U(ρ, τ, t)]
]
− gt−δ + 2ǫ
≤ inf
ρ,τ∈Tt
Et−δ [Et [U(ρ, τ, t)]]− gt−δ + 2ǫ
≤ inf
ρ,τ∈Tt
Et−δ [U(ρ, τ, t− δ)] − gt−δ + 3ǫ
= inf
ρ,τ∈Tt−δ
Et−δ [U(ρ ∨ t, τ ∨ t, t− δ)]− gt−δ + 3ǫ
≤ inf
ρ,τ∈Tt−δ
Et−δ [U(ρ, τ, t− δ)] − gt−δ + 5ǫ
= 5ǫ.
7This implies that (ρˆ, τˆ ) ∈ (T2t )
2 is a 5ǫ-optimizer for gt−δ in (3.2) for any δ ∈ [0, h]. 
Lemma 3.4. Let H : [0,∞]2 × Ω 7→ R such that H(s, t) is Fs∨t-measurable and satisfies Assump-
tion 2.4. Then for any ǫ > 0, there exists h > 0, such that for any t ∈ [0,∞), there exists ρˆ ∈ Tt
such that for any δ ∈ [0, h], ρˆ is an ǫ-optimizer for
inf
ρ∈Tt−δ
Et−δ [H(ρ, t− δ)] .
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Lemma 3.3 and thus we omit it here. 
Lemma 3.5. Let G : [0,∞]3 × Ω 7→ R such that G(r, s, t) is Fr∨s∨t-measurable and satisfies
Assumption 2.4. Then for t ≥ 0,
ft := sup
ρ∈T2t
inf
τ∈T2t
Et [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)] = inf
τ∈T2t
sup
ρ∈T2t
Et [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)] . (3.4)
Moreover, the process (ft)t≥0 is right continuous.
Proof. The equality in (3.4) follows from [19, Proposition 3.3]. Now fix t ∈ [0,∞) and let tn ց t
with |tn − t| < 1/n. For any ǫ > 0, by Lemma 3.1, there exists h > 0 and (ρˆ, τˆ ) ∈ (T
2
t )
2, such that
for any δ ∈ [0, h], (ρˆ, τˆ ) ∈ (T2t )
2 is an ǫ-saddle point for the game ft−h, i.e., for any ρ,τ ∈ T
2
t−δ,
Et−δ [G(ρ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρ], t− δ)]− ǫ ≤ Et−δ [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t− δ)] ≤ Et−δ [G(ρˆ[τ ], τ [ρˆ], t− δ)] + ǫ.
Then for n large enough such that |tn − t| < h, we have that
|ftn − ft| ≤ |ftn − Etn [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], tn)]|+ |Etn [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], tn)]− Etn [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t)]|
+ |Etn [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t)]− Et [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t)]|+ |Et [G(ρˆ[τ ], τ [ρˆ], t)]− ft|
≤ ǫ+ η(1/n) + |Etn [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t)] − Et [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t)]|+ ǫ.
Since the process (Et+s [G(ρˆ[τˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ], t)])s≥0 is a martingale w.r.t. the filtration (Ft+s)s≥0 satisfying
the usual conditions, by [8, Theorem 3.13, page 16], it is right continuous. Therefore,
lim sup
n→∞
|ftn − ft| ≤ 2ǫ.
By the arbitrariness of ǫ, limn→∞ ftn = ft, and thus the conclusion follows. 
Lemma 3.6. Let G : [0,∞]3 × Ω 7→ R such that G(r, s, t) is Fr∨s∨t-measurable and satisfies
Assumption 2.4. Then the process (gt)t≥0 defined by
gt := inf
ρ,τ∈T2t
Et [G(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)]
is right continuous.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Lemma 3.5 and thus we omit it here. 
Proposition 3.7. Let U : [0,∞]3 × Ω 7→ R such that U(r, s, t) is Fr∨s∨t-measurable and satisfies
Assumption 2.4. For t ≥ 0, let
V t := sup
ρ∈T3t
inf
τ ,σ∈T3t
Et [U(ρ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρ,σ],σ [ρ,τ ])] (3.5)
8and
V t := inf
τ ,σ∈T3t
sup
ρ∈T3t
Et [U(ρ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρ,σ],σ [ρ,τ ])] .
Then for any µ ∈ T ,
V µ = V µ = sup
ρ∈Tµ
inf
θ∈Tµ
Eµ
[
Xρ1{ρ≤θ} + Yθ1{ρ>θ}
]
= inf
θ∈Tµ
sup
ρ∈Tµ
Eµ
[
Xρ1{ρ≤θ} + Yθ1{ρ>θ}
]
, (3.6)
where for t ≥ 0,
Xt := inf
τ ,σ∈T2t
Et [U(t, τ [σ ],σ[τ ])] ,
and
Yt :=
(
sup
ρ∈T2t
inf
σ∈T2t
Et [U(ρ[σ ], t,σ [ρ])]
)
∧
(
sup
ρ∈T2t
inf
τ∈T2t
Et [U(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)]
)
.
Moreover, there exists an ǫ-saddle point for (3.5) with t replaced by µ for any ǫ > 0.
Proof. Denote
Y 2t := sup
ρ∈T2t
inf
σ∈T2t
Et [U(ρ[σ ], t,σ [ρ])] and Y
3
t := sup
ρ∈T2t
inf
τ∈T2t
Et [U(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)] .
For t ≥ 0, let θ = (t, θ1(s) ≡ s+ 1) ∈ T
2
t . Then
Xt ≤ inf
σ∈T2t
Et [U(t, t,σ [θ])] ≤ Y
2
t .
Similarly, we can show that Xt ≤ Y
3
t . Hence,
Xt ≤ Yt.
Moreover, by Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, (Xt)t≥0 and (Yt)t≥0 are right continuous. Then from the classical
theory of Dynkin games, we have that for t ≥ 0,
Vt := sup
ρ∈Tt
inf
θ∈Tt
Et
[
Xρ1{ρ≤θ} + Yθ1{ρ>θ}
]
= inf
θ∈Tt
sup
ρ∈Tt
Et
[
Xρ1{ρ≤θ} + Yθ1{ρ>θ}
]
(3.7)
= sup
ρ∈Tt
inf
θ∈Tt
Et
[
Xρ1{ρ<θ} + Yθ1{ρ≥θ}
]
= inf
θ∈Tt
sup
ρ∈Tt
Et
[
Xρ1{ρ<θ} + Yθ1{ρ≥θ}
]
,
and the process (Vt)t≥0 is right continuous.
Now fix µ ∈ T and let ǫ > 0. Define ρˆ, θˆ ∈ Tµ as
ρˆ := inf{t ≥ µ : Vt ≤ Xt + ǫ} and θˆ := inf{t ≥ µ : Vt ≥ Yt − ǫ}. (3.8)
Then (ρˆ, θˆ) ∈ (Tµ)
2 is an ǫ-saddle point for the Dynkin game Vµ defined in (3.7) with t replaced by
µ. By Lemma 3.3, there exists hx > 0 such that for any t ≥ 0, there exists (τˆ 1t = (τˆ
1
t , τˆ
1
t,3), σˆ
1
t =
(σˆ1t , σˆ
1
t,2)) ∈ (T
2
t )
2 being an ǫ-optimizer for Xt′ for any t
′ ∈ [t−hx, t]. Similarly, by Lemma 3.1, there
exists hy > 0, such that for t ≥ 0, there exist (ρˆ2t = (ρˆ
2
t , ρˆ
2
t,3), σˆ
2
t = (σˆ
2
t , σ
2
t,1)), (ρˆ
3
t = (ρˆ
3
t , ρˆ
3
t,2), τˆ
3
t =
(τˆ3t , τˆ
3
t,1)) ∈ (T
2
t )
2 being ǫ-saddle points for Y 2t′ and Y
3
t′ respectively for any t
′ ∈ [t− hy, t]. Further-
more, by Lemma 3.4 there exists hz > 0 such that for any t ≥ 0, there exist ρˆ23t , τˆ
13
t , σˆ
12
t ∈ Tt being
ǫ-optimizers for
Z23t′ := sup
ρ∈Tt′
Et′
[
U(ρ, t′, t′)
]
, Z13t′ := inf
τ∈Tt′
Et′
[
U(t′, τ, t′)
]
, Z12t′ := inf
σ∈Tt′
Et′
[
U(t′, t′, σ)
]
9respectively for any t′ ∈ [t− hz, t]. Let h := hx ∧ hy ∧ hz, and
A := {V
θˆ
≥ Y 2
θˆ
− ǫ}.
For any t ≥ 0, define
φh(t) := ([t/h] + 1)h (3.9)
Observe that φt(·) is right continuous and φh(t) > t for t <∞.
Recall ρˆ defined in (3.8). Now define ρˆ = (ρˆ, ρˆ2, ρˆ3, ρˆ23), τˆ = (τˆ , τˆ1, τˆ3, τˆ13), σˆ = (σˆ, σˆ1, σˆ2, σˆ12) as
follows.
τˆ :=

θˆ, on A,∞, on Ac, and σˆ :=

θˆ, on A
c,
∞, on A,
and
ρˆ2(t) := ρˆ
2
φh(t)
, ρˆ3(t) := ρˆ
3
φh(t)
, ρˆ23(s, t) :=


ρˆ2
φh(s),3
(t), if s < t,
ρˆ3
φh(t),2
(s), if s > t,
ρˆ23
φh(s)
, if s = t,
and
τˆ1(t) := τˆ
1
φh(t)
, τˆ3(t) := τˆ
3
φh(t)
, τˆ13(s, t) :=


τˆ1
φh(s),3
(t), if s < t,
τˆ3
φh(t),1
(s), if s > t,
τˆ13
φh(s)
, if s = t,
and
σˆ1(t) := σˆ
1
φh(t)
, σˆ2(t) := σˆ
2
φh(t)
, σˆ12(s, t) :=


σˆ1
φh(s),2
(t), if s < t,
σˆ2
φh(t),1
(s), if s > t,
σˆ12
φh(s)
, if s = t.
It can be shown that ρˆ, τˆ , σˆ ∈ T3µ. In the rest of the proof, we will show that (ρˆ, (τˆ , σˆ)) is a 17ǫ-saddle
point for (3.5) with t replaced by µ.
Part 1. We show that
|Eµ [U(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])]− Vµ| ≤ 8ǫ, (3.10)
where V is defined in (3.7). We consider five cases.
Case 1.1: A1 := {ρˆ < θˆ}.
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])1A1 ] = Eµ
[
Eρˆ
[
U
(
ρˆ, τˆ 1φh(ρˆ)
[
σˆ1φh(ρˆ)
]
, σˆ1φh(ρˆ)
[
τˆ 1φh(ρˆ)
])]
1A1
]
∈ [Eµ [Xρˆ1A1 ] ,Et [Xρˆ1A1 ] + ǫ] .
Case 1.2: A2 := {ρˆ = θˆ} ∩A. It can be shown that for any t ≥ 0,
Xt ≤ Z
12
t ≤ Y
2
t . (3.11)
Hence, on A,
Z12
θˆ
≤ Y 2
θˆ
≤ V
θˆ
+ ǫ ≤ Y
θˆ
+ ǫ. (3.12)
Then
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])1A2 ] = Eµ
[
E
θˆ
[
U
(
θˆ, θˆ, σˆ12
φh(θˆ)
)]
1A2
]
∈
[
Eµ
[
X
θˆ
1A2
]
,Eµ
[
Y
θˆ
1A2
]
+ 2ǫ
]
.
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Case 1.3: A3 := {ρˆ = θˆ} ∩A
c. It can be shown that for any t ≥ 0,
Xt ≤ Z
13
t ≤ Y
3
t . (3.13)
By the definition of θˆ in (3.8), we have that on Ac,
Y 2
θˆ
∧ Y 3
θˆ
− ǫ ≤ V
θˆ
< Y 2
θˆ
− ǫ.
This implies that on Ac,
Y 2
θˆ
> Y 3
θˆ
= Y 2
θˆ
∧ Y 3
θˆ
= Y
θˆ
. (3.14)
Then
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ ], σˆ[ρˆ, τˆ ])1A3 ] = Eµ
[
E
θˆ
[
U
(
θˆ, τˆ 13
φh(θˆ)
, θˆ
)]
1A3
]
∈
[
Eµ
[
X
θˆ
1A3
]
,Eµ
[
Y
θˆ
1A3
]
+ ǫ
]
.
Case 1.4: A4 := {ρˆ > θˆ} ∩A. By (3.12), we have that
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])1A4 ] = Eµ
[
E
θˆ
[
U
(
ρˆ2
φh(θˆ)
[
σˆ2
φh(θˆ)
]
, θˆ, σˆ2
φh(θˆ)
[
ρˆ2
φh(θˆ)
])]
1A4
]
∈
[
Eµ
[
Y 2
θˆ
1A4
]
− ǫ,Eµ
[
Y 2
θˆ
1A4
]
+ ǫ
]
⊂
[
Eµ
[
Y
θˆ
1A4
]
− ǫ,Eµ
[
Y
θˆ
1A4
]
+ 2ǫ
]
.
Case 1.5: A5 := {ρˆ > θˆ} ∩A
c. By (3.14), we have that
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])1A5 ] = Eµ
[
E
θˆ
[
U
(
ρˆ3
φh(θˆ)
[
τˆ 3
φh(θˆ)
]
, τˆ 3
φh(θˆ)
[
ρˆ3
φh(θˆ)
]
, θˆ
)]
1A5
]
∈
[
Eµ
[
Y 3ρˆ 1A5
]
− ǫ,Eµ
[
Y 3ρˆ 1A5
]
+ ǫ
]
⊂ [Eµ [Yρˆ1A4 ]− ǫ,Eµ [Yρˆ1A5 ] + ǫ] .
From cases 1.1-1.5, we have that
Vµ − 3ǫ ≤ Eµ
[
Xρˆ1{ρˆ≤θˆ} + Yθˆ1{ρˆ>θˆ}
]
− 2ǫ
≤ Eµ [U(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])]
≤ Eµ
[
Xρˆ1{ρˆ<θˆ} + Yθˆ1{ρˆ≥θˆ}
]
+ 7ǫ ≤ Vµ + 8ǫ.
Part 2: We show that for any ρ ∈ T3t ,
Eµ [U(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])] ≤ Vµ + 9ǫ. (3.15)
Take ρ = (ρ, ρ2, ρ3, ρ23) ∈ T
3
µ. We consider five cases.
Case 2.1: B1 := {ρ < θˆ}.
Eµ [U(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1B1 ] = Eµ
[
Eρ
[
U
(
ρ, τˆ 1φh(ρ)
[
σˆ1φh(ρ)
]
, σˆ1φh(ρ)
[
τˆ 1φh(ρ)
])]
1B1
]
≤ Eµ [Xρ1B1 ] + ǫ.
Case 2.2: B2 := {ρ = θˆ} ∩A. By (3.11) and (3.12),
Eµ [U(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1B2 ] = Eµ
[
E
θˆ
[
U
(
θˆ, θˆ, σˆ12
φh(θˆ)
)]
1A2
]
≤ Eµ
[
Y
θˆ
1B2
]
+ 2ǫ.
Case 2.3: B3 := {ρ = θˆ} ∩A
c. By (3.13) and (3.14),
Eµ [U(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1B3 ] = Eµ
[
E
θˆ
[
U
(
θˆ, τˆ 13
φh(θˆ)
, θˆ
)]
1B3
]
≤ Eµ
[
Y
θˆ
1B3
]
+ ǫ.
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Case 2.4: B4 := {ρ > θˆ} ∩A. Define ρ
2
θˆ
:= (ρ2(θˆ), ρ23(θˆ, ·)) ∈ T
2
θˆ
. We have that
Eµ [U(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1B4 ] = Eµ
[
E
θˆ
[
U
(
ρ2
θˆ
[
σˆ2
φh(θˆ)
]
, θˆ, σˆ2
φh(θˆ)
[
ρ2
θˆ
])]
1B4
]
≤ Eµ
[
Y 2
θˆ
1B4
]
+ ǫ
≤ Eµ
[
Y
θˆ
1B4
]
+ 2ǫ.
Case 2.5: B5 := {ρ > θˆ} ∩A
c. Define ρ3
θˆ
:= (ρ3(θˆ), ρ23(·, θˆ)) ∈ T
2
θˆ
. We have that
Eµ [U(ρ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1B5 ] = Eµ
[
E
θˆ
[
U
(
ρ3
θˆ
[
τˆ 3
φh(θˆ)
]
, τˆ 3
φh(θˆ)
[
ρ3
θˆ
]
, θˆ
)]
1B5
]
≤ Eµ
[
Y 3
θˆ
1B5
]
+ ǫ
= Eµ
[
Y
θˆ
1B5
]
+ ǫ.
From cases 2.1-2.5, we have that
Eµ [U(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])] ≤ Eµ
[
Xρ1{ρ<θˆ} + Yθˆ1{ρ≥θˆ}
]
+ 7ǫ
≤ Eµ
[
Xρˆ1{ρˆ<θˆ} + Yθˆ1{ρˆ≥θˆ}
]
+ 8ǫ
≤ Vµ + 9ǫ.
Part 3: We show that for any (τ ,σ) ∈ (T3µ)
2,
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τ ,σ], τ [ρˆ,σ ],σ [ρˆ, τ ])] ≥ Vµ − 5ǫ. (3.16)
Take (τ = (τ, τ1, τ3, τ13),σ = (σ, σ1, σ2, σ12)) ∈ (T
3
µ)
2. We consider four cases.
Case 3.1: C1 := {ρˆ ≤ τ ∧ σ}.
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρˆ,σ],σ [ρˆ, τ ])1C1 ] = Eµ [Eρˆ [U(ρˆ, τ [ρˆ,σ ],σ [ρˆ, τ ])] 1C1 ] ≥ Eµ [Xρˆ1C1 ] .
Case 3.2: C2 := {ρˆ > τ ∧ σ} ∩ {τ = σ}. It can be shown that for any t ≥ 0,
Z23t ≥ Y
2
t , Y
3
t ≥ Yt.
Then we have that
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρˆ,σ ],σ[ρˆ, τ ])1C2 ] = Eµ
[
Eτ
[
U
(
ρˆ23φh(τ), τ, τ
)]
1C2
]
≥ Eµ
[
Z23τ 1C2
]
− ǫ
≥ Eµ [Yτ∧σ1C2 ]− ǫ.
Case 3.3: C3 := {ρˆ > τ ∧ σ} ∩ {τ < σ}. Define σ
2
τ := (σ2(τ), σ12(·, τ) ∈ T
2
τ . Then
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρˆ,σ ],σ [ρˆ, τ ])1C3 ] = Eµ
[
Eτ
[
U
(
ρˆ2φh(τ)
[
σ2τ
]
, τ,σ2τ
[
ρˆ2φh(τ)
])]
1C3
]
≥ Eµ
[
Y 2τ 1C3
]
− ǫ
≥ Eµ [Yτ∧σ1C3 ]− ǫ.
Case 3.4: C4 := {ρˆ > τ ∧ σ} ∩ {τ > σ}. Similar to case 3.3, we can show that
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρˆ,σ],σ [ρˆ, τ ])1C4 ] ≤ Eµ [Yτ∧σ1C4 ]− ǫ.
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From cases 3.1-3.4, we have that
Eµ [U(ρˆ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρˆ,σ],σ [ρˆ, τ ])] ≥ Eµ
[
Xρˆ1{ρˆ≤τ∧σ} + Yτ∧σ1{ρˆ>τ∧σ}
]
− 3ǫ
≥ Eµ
[
Xρˆ1{ρˆ≤θˆ} + Yτ∧σ1{ρˆ>θˆ}
]
− 4ǫ
≥ Vµ − 5ǫ.
By (3.10),(3.13) and (3.16), (ρˆ, (τˆ , σˆ)) ∈ (T3µ)
3 is a 17ǫ-saddle point for (3.5) with t replaced by
µ. 
4. Proof of Theorem 2.6
In this section, we will construct an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the three-player game by using ǫ-Nash
equilibriums of two-player games, as well as ǫ-saddle points of games like (3.5).
Let ǫ > 0 be fixed. By lemmas 3.2-3.4, we can choose h > 0, such that for any t, there exist
(τ 1t = (τ
1
t , τ
1
t,3),σ
1
t = (σ
1
t , σ
1
t,2)) ∈ (Tt)
2 being an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game
Et′
[
U i(t′, τ [σ ],σ [τ ])
]
, τ ,σ ∈ Tt′ , i = 2, 3,
for any t′ ∈ [t − h, t], and (ρ2t = (ρ
2
t , ρ
2
t,3),σ
2
t = (σ
2
t , σ
2
t,1)) ∈ (Tt)
2 being an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for
the game
Et′
[
U i(ρ[σ ], t′,σ [ρ])
]
, ρ,σ ∈ Tt′ , i = 1, 3,
for any t′ ∈ [t − h, t], and (ρ3t = (ρ
3
t , ρ
3
t,2), τ
3
t = (τ
3
t , τ
3
t,1)) ∈ (Tt)
2 being an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for
the game
Et′
[
U i(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t′)
]
, ρ, τ ∈ Tt′ , i = 1, 2,
for any t′ ∈ [t− h, t], and ρi,23
t
∈ Tt being an ǫ-optimizer for
inf
ρ∈Tt′
Et′
[
U i(ρ, t′, t′)
]
for any t′ ∈ [t− h, t] for i = 2, 3, and τ i,13t ∈ Tt being an ǫ-optimizer for
inf
τ∈Tt′
Et′
[
U i(t′, τ, t′)
]
for any t′ ∈ [t− h, t] for i = 1, 3, and σi,12t ∈ Tt being an ǫ-optimizers for
inf
σ∈Tt′
Et′
[
U i(t′, t′, σ)
]
.
13
Recall φh(·) defined in (3.9). For t ≥ 0, define
X1t := inf
τ ,σ∈Tt
Et
[
U1(t, τ [σ ],σ [τ ])
]
,
Z1t := Et
[
U1
(
t, τ 1φh(t)
[
σ1φh(t)
]
,σ1φh(t)
[
τ 1φh(t)
])]
,
Y 1,2t := Et
[
U1
(
ρ2φh(t)
[
σ2φh(t)
]
, t,σ2φh(t)
[
ρ2φh(t)
])]
,
Y 1,3t := Et
[
U1
(
ρ3φh(t)
[
τ 3φh(t)
]
, τ 3φh(t)
[
ρ3φh(t)
]
, t
)]
,
Y 1t := Y
1,2
t ∧ Y
1,3
t + ǫ,
V 1t := sup
ρ∈Tθ
inf
λ∈Tθ
Et
[
X1ρ1{ρ≤λ} + Y
1
λ 1{ρ>λ}
]
,
µ1 := inf{t ≥ θ : V 1t ≤W
1
t + ǫ},
and X2t , Z
2
t , Y
2,1
t , Y
2,3
t , Y
2
t , V
2
t , µ
2,X3t , Z
3
t , Y
3,1
t , Y
3,2
t , Y
3
t , V
3
t , µ
3 in a symmetric way.
Lemma 4.1. For i = 1, 2, 3 and any t ≥ 0, Xit ≤ Y
i
t .
Proof. For t ≥ 0, let ρ˜ = τ˜ = (t,∞) ∈ T2t . Then
X1t ≤ Et
[
U1
(
t, τ˜
[
σ2φh(t)
]
,σ2φh(t) [τ˜ ]
)]
= Et
[
U1
(
t, t,σ2φh(t) [τ˜ ]
)]
= Et
[
U1
(
ρ˜
[
σ2φh(t)
]
, t,σ2φh(t) [ρ˜]
)]
≤ Y 1,2t + ǫ.
Similarly, we can show that X1t ≤ Y
1,3
t + ǫ. Hence, X
1
t ≤ Y
1
t . 
Lemma 4.2. For i = 1, 2, 3, the processes (Zit)t≥0 and (Y
i
t )t≥0 are right continuous.
Proof. Let t ∈ [0,∞). Let tn ց t. Without loss of generality, we assume that |tn − t| < (1/n) ∧
(φh(t)− t). Then
|Z1tn − Z
1
t |
=
∣∣∣Etn [U1 (tn, τ 1φh(t)
[
σ1φh(t)
]
,σ1φh(t)
[
τ 1φh(t)
])]
− Et
[
U1
(
t, τ 1φh(t)
[
σ1φh(t)
]
,σ1φh(t)
[
τ 1φh(t)
])]∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Etn [U1 (t, τ 1φh(t)
[
σ1φh(t)
]
,σ1φh(t)
[
τ 1φh(t)
])]
− Et
[
U1
(
t, τ 1φh(t)
[
σ1φh(t)
]
,σ1φh(t)
[
τ 1φh(t)
])]∣∣∣+ η(1/n).
Since (
Et+s
[
U1
(
t, τ 1φh(t)
[
σ1φh(t)
]
,σ1φh(t)
[
τ 1φh(t)
])])
s≥0
is a martingale w.r.t. the filtration (Ft+s)s≥0 satisfying the usual conditions, it is right continuous.
Hence, Z1tn → Z
1
t . Similarly, we can show that (Y
1,2
t )t≥0 and (Y
1,3
t )t≥0 are right continuous. 
By Lemmas 3.6 and 4.2, we have that for i = 1, 2, 3, the process (V it )t≥0 is right continuous.
Then we can choose δ > 0 being Fθ-measurable, such that for i = 1, 2, 3,
Eθ
[
sup
0≤r≤δ
∣∣∣Ziµi+r − Ziµi∣∣∣
]
< ǫ and Eθ
∣∣∣V iµi+δ − V iµi∣∣∣ < ǫ. (4.1)
It can be shown that for any λ ∈ Tθ, λ+ δ ∈ Tθ+.
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By Proposition 3.7, there exist (ρ1, (τ 1 = (τ 1, τ 11, τ
1
3, τ
1
13),σ
1 = (σ1, σ11, σ
1
2, σ
1
12))) ∈ (T
3
µ1+δ)
3
being an ǫ-saddle point for the game
V˜µ1+δ := sup
ρ∈T3
µ1+δ
inf
τ ,σ∈T3
µ1+δ
Eµ1+δ
[
U1(ρ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρ,σ ],σ [ρ,τ ])
]
, (4.2)
and (τ 2, (ρ2 = (ρ2, ρ2
2
, ρ2
3
, ρ2
23
),σ2 = (σ2, σ21, σ
2
2, σ
2
12))) ∈ (T
3
µ2+δ)
3 being an ǫ-saddle point for the
game
sup
τ∈T3
µ2+δ
inf
ρ,σ∈T3
µ2+δ
Eµ2+δ
[
U2(ρ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρ,σ],σ [ρ,τ ])
]
,
and (σ3, (ρ3 = (ρ3, ρ3
2
, ρ3
3
, ρ3
23
), τ 3 = (τ3τ31, τ
3
3, τ
3
13))) ∈ (T
3
µ3+δ)
3 being an ǫ-saddle point for the
game
sup
σ∈T3
µ3+δ
inf
ρ,τ∈T3
µ3+δ
Eµ3+δ
[
U3(ρ[τ ,σ ], τ [ρ,σ],σ [ρ,τ ])
]
.
Now define ρˆ = (ρˆ, ρˆ2, ρˆ3, ρˆ23), τˆ = (τˆ , τˆ1, τˆ3, τˆ13), σˆ = (σˆ, σˆ1, σˆ2, σˆ12) as follows.
ρˆ :=


µ1, on A,
ρ2, on B,
ρ3, on C,
ρˆ2(t) :=


ρ2
2
(t), on B ∩ {t ≥ µ2 + δ},
ρ3
2
(t), on C ∩ {t ≥ µ3 + δ},
ρ2
φh(t)
, otherwise,
ρˆ3(t) :=


ρ2
3
(t), on B ∩ {t ≥ µ2 + δ},
ρ3
3
(t), on C ∩ {t ≥ µ3 + δ},
ρ3
φh(t)
, otherwise,
ρˆ23(s, t) :=


ρ2
23
(s, t), on B ∩ {µ2 + δ ≤ s ∧ t},
ρ3
23
(s, t), on C ∩ {µ3 + δ ≤ s ∧ t},
ρ3,23
φh(t)
, on B ∩ {s = t = µ2},
ρ2,23
φh(t)
, on C ∩ {s = t = µ3},
ρ2
φh(s),3
(t), on D ∩ {s ≤ t},
ρ3
φh(t),2
(s), on D ∩ {s > t},
and
τˆ :=


µ2, on B,
τ1, on A,
τ3, on C,
τˆ1(t) :=


τ11(t), on A ∩ {t ≥ µ
1 + δ},
τ31(t), on C ∩ {t ≥ µ
3 + δ},
τ1
φh(t)
, otherwise,
τˆ3(t) :=


τ13(t), on A ∩ {t ≥ µ
1 + δ},
τ33(t), on C ∩ {t ≥ µ
3 + δ},
τ3
φh(t)
, otherwise,
τˆ13(s, t) :=


τ113(s, t), on A ∩ {µ
1 + δ ≤ s ∧ t},
τ313(s, t), on C ∩ {µ
3 + δ ≤ s ∧ t},
τ3,13
φh(t)
, on A ∩ {s = t = µ1},
τ1,13
φh(t)
, on C ∩ {s = t = µ3},
τ1
φh(s),3
(t), on E ∩ {s ≤ t},
τ3
φh(t),1
(s), on E ∩ {s > t},
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and
σˆ :=


µ3, on C,
σ1, on A,
σ2, on B,
σˆ1(t) :=


σ11(t), on A ∩ {t ≥ µ
1 + δ},
σ21(t), on B ∩ {t ≥ µ
2 + δ},
σ1
φh(t)
, otherwise,
σˆ2(t) :=


σ12(t), on A ∩ {t ≥ µ
1 + δ},
σ22(t), on B ∩ {t ≥ µ
2 + δ},
σ2
φh(t)
, otherwise,
σˆ12(s, t) :=


σ112(s, t), on A ∩ {µ
1 + δ ≤ s ∧ t},
σ212(s, t), on B ∩ {µ
2 + δ ≤ s ∧ t},
σ2,12
φh(t)
, on A ∩ {s = t = µ1},
σ1,12
φh(t)
, on B ∩ {s = t = µ2},
σ1
φh(s),2
(t), on F ∩ {s ≤ t},
σ2
φh(t),1
(s), on F ∩ {s > t},
where
A := {µ1 ≤ µ2, µ1 ≤ µ3}, B := {µ2 < µ1, µ2 ≤ µ3}, C := {µ3 < µ1, µ3 < µ2},
and D (resp. E,F ) is the complement of the first four cases in the definition of ρˆ23 (resp. τˆ13, σˆ12).
It can be shown that ρˆ, τˆ , σˆ ∈ T3θ. The next result shows that (ρˆ, τˆ , σˆ) is a 13ǫ-Nash equilibrium for
the game (2.1) when N = 3. In particular, Theorem 2.6 holds for N = 3.
Proposition 4.3. (ρˆ, τˆ , σˆ) ∈ (T3θ)
3 is a 13ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game (2.1) for N = 3.
Proof. First, we have that
Eθ
[
U1(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])
]
= Eθ
[
Eµ1
[
U1
(
µ1, τ 1φh(µ1)
[
σ1φh(µ1)
]
,σ1φh(µ1)
[
τ 1φh(µ1)
])]
1A
]
+ Eθ
[
Eµ2
[
U1
(
ρ2φh(µ2)
[
σ2φh(µ2)
]
, µ2,σ2φh(µ2)
[
ρ2φh(µ2)
])]
1B
]
+ Eθ
[
Eµ3
[
U1
(
ρ3φh(µ3)
[
τ 3φh(µ3)
]
, τ 3φh(µ3)
[
ρ3φh(µ3)
]
, µ3
)]
1C
]
= Eθ
[
Z1µ11A + Y
1,2
µ2
1B + Y
1,3
µ3
1C
]
.
Now take ρ = (ρ, ρ2, ρ3, ρ23) ∈ T
3
θ. We will show that
Eθ
[
U1(ρ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])
]
≤ Eθ
[
U1(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])
]
+ 13ǫ. (4.3)
We consider seven cases.
Case 1: D1 := {ρ < µ
1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3}. As X1t ≤ Z
1
t for any t ≥ 0,
µ1 ≤ inf{t ≥ θ : V 1t ≤ X
1
t + ǫ}.
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Therefore, the process (Vt)t≥0 is a sub-martingale from θ to µ
1. Hence,
Eθ
[
U1(ρ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1D1
]
= Eθ
[
Eρ
[
U1
(
ρ,τ 1φh(ρ)
[
σ1φh(ρ)
]
,σ1φh(ρ)
[
τ 1φh(ρ)
])]
1D1
]
= Eθ
[
Z1ρ1D1
]
≤ Eθ
[
V 1ρ 1D1
]
= Eθ
[
Eµ1∧µ2∧µ3
[
V 1ρ∧µ1∧µ2∧µ3
]
1D1
]
≤ Eθ
[
V 1µ1∧µ2∧µ31D1
]
= Eθ
[(
V 1µ11A + V
1
µ21B + V
1
µ31C
)
1D1
]
≤ Eθ
[(
Z1µ11A + Y
1,2
µ2
1B + Y
1,3
µ3
1C
)
1D1
]
+ 3ǫ.
Case 2: D2 := {µ
1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3 ≤ ρ < µ1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3 + δ} ∩ A. By [8, Lemma 2.15, page 8],
{µ1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3 ≤ ρ} ∩A ∈ Fρ, and thus D2 ∈ Fρ. Then by (4.1),
Eθ
[
U1(ρ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1D2
]
= Eθ
[
Eρ
[
U1
(
ρ,τ 1φh(ρ)
[
σ1φh(ρ)
]
,σ1φh(ρ)
[
τ 1φh(ρ)
])]
1D2
]
= Eθ
[
Z1ρ1D2
]
≤ Eθ
[
Z1µ11D2
]
+ ǫ
= Eθ
[(
Z1µ11A + Y
1,2
µ2
1B + Y
1,3
µ3
1C
)
1D2
]
+ ǫ.
Case 3: D3 := {ρ ≥ µ
1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3 + δ} ∩A. Recall V˜µ1+δ defined in (4.2). By Proposition 3.7,
V˜µ1+δ = sup
ρ∈Tµ1+δ
inf
λ∈Tµ1+δ
Eµ+δ
[
X1ρ1{ρ≤λ} + Y˜
1
λ 1{ρ>λ}
]
,
where
Y˜ 1t :=
(
sup
ρ∈T2t
inf
σ∈T2t
Et
[
U1(ρ[σ], t,σ [ρ])
])
∧
(
sup
ρ∈T2t
inf
τ∈T2t
Et
[
U1(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)
])
.
We have that
sup
ρ∈T2t
inf
σ∈T2t
Et
[
U1(ρ[σ ], t,σ [ρ])
]
≤ sup
ρ∈T2t
Et
[
U1
(
ρ
[
σ2φh(t)
]
, t,σ2φh(t) [ρ]
)]
≤ Y 1,2t + ǫ,
and similarly supρ∈T2t infτ∈T2t Et
[
U1(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ], t)
]
≤ Y 1,3t + ǫ. Therefore, for any t ≥ 0, Y˜
1
t ≤ Y
1
t ,
and thus
V˜ 1µ1+δ ≤ V
1
µ1+δ.
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Then by (4.1),
Eθ
[
U1(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1D3
]
= Eθ
[
Eµ1+δ
[
U1
(
ρ
[
τ 1,σ1
]
, τ 1
[
ρ,σ1
]
,σ1
[
ρ,τ 1
])]
1D3
]
≤ Eθ
[
V˜ 1µ1+δ1D3
]
+ ǫ
≤ Eθ
[
V 1µ1+δ1D3
]
+ ǫ
≤ Eθ
[
V 1µ11D3
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ Eθ
[
Z1µ11D3
]
+ 3ǫ
= Eθ
[(
Z1µ11A + Y
1,2
µ2
1B + Y
1,3
µ3
1C
)
1D3
]
+ 3ǫ.
Case 4: D4 := {ρ = µ
1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3} ∩B. It can be shown that
Y 1,2t ≥ inf
σ∈Tt
Et
[
U1(t, t, σ)
]
− ǫ ≥ Et
[
U1
(
t, t, σ1,12
φh(t)
)]
− 2ǫ.
Therefore,
Eθ
[
U1(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1D4
]
= Eθ
[
Eµ2
[
U1
(
µ2, µ2, σ1,12
φh(µ2)
)]
1D4
]
≤ Eθ
[
Y 1,2
µ2
1D4
]
+ 2ǫ
= Eθ
[(
Z1µ11A + Y
1,2
µ2
1B + Y
1,3
µ3
1C
)
1D4
]
+ 2ǫ.
Case 5: D5 := {ρ > µ
1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3} ∩B. Let ρµ2 := (ρ2(µ
2), ρ23(µ
2, ·)) ∈ T2
µ2
.
Eθ
[
U1(ρ[τˆ , σˆ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1D5
]
= Eθ
[
Eµ2
[
U1
(
ρµ2
[
σ2φh(µ2)
]
, µ2,σ2φh(µ2)
[
ρµ2
])]
1D5
]
≤ Eθ
[
Y 1,2
µ2
1D5
]
+ ǫ
= Eθ
[(
Z1µ11A + Y
1,2
µ2
1B + Y
1,3
µ3
1C
)
1D5
]
+ ǫ.
Case 6: D6 := {ρ = µ
1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3} ∩ C. Similar to case 4, we can show that
Eθ
[
U1(ρ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ ], σˆ[ρ, τˆ ])1D6
]
≤ Eθ
[(
Z1µ11A + Y
1,2
µ2
1B + Y
1,3
µ3
1C
)
1D6
]
+ 2ǫ.
Case 7: D7 := {ρ > µ
1 ∧ µ2 ∧ µ3} ∩ C. Similar to case 5, we can show that
Eθ
[
U1(ρ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρ, σˆ], σˆ [ρ, τˆ ])1D7
]
≤ Eθ
[(
Z1µ11A + Y
1,2
µ2
1B + Y
1,3
µ3
1C
)
1D7
]
+ ǫ.
From cases 1-7, we have (4.3) holds. Similarly, we can show that for any τ ,σ ∈ T3θ,
Eθ
[
U2(ρˆ[τ , σˆ ], τ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τ ])
]
≤ Eθ
[
U2(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])
]
+ 13ǫ,
and
Eθ
[
U3(ρˆ[τˆ ,σ ], τˆ [ρˆ,σ],σ [ρˆ, τˆ ])
]
≤ Eθ
[
U3(ρˆ[τˆ , σˆ ], τˆ [ρˆ, σˆ], σˆ [ρˆ, τˆ ])
]
+ 13ǫ.

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